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GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING SPACE: LESSONS
FOR THE "CHOOSE LIFE" SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATE
CONTROVERSY
Dara E. Purvis
Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008; University of Cambridge, M.Phil. 2005
Abstract: As license plates emblazoned with the message "Choose Life" have
proliferated across America, so too have lawsuits challenging such
specialty license plates. The holdings of such cases have run the gamut,
resulting in a current three-way circuit split between the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Circuits. None of the analysis of the controversy up to this
point, however, has considered an illuminating analogy: advertising space
owned and operated by the government. Examining the parallels between
advertising space and specialty license plates informs and develops
doctrinal analysis of the dispute, establishing that the "Choose Life"
license plate programs as they currently exist violate the First
Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the message "Choose Life" has appeared on license plates across
the country. Printed directly on the license plate, the anti-abortion message has been
challenged as representing a violation of constitutional principles in several jurisdictions,
with diverging results in three different circuits.
One challenge to a plate scheme was dismissed by the Fifth Circuit for lack of
standing.' The Fourth and Sixth Circuits addressed the substantive freedom of speech
question, analyzing what type of forum a license plate is and what type of speech-
government or private-the "Choose Life" message is. The two cases, Planned
Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose and A CL U of Tennessee v. Bredesen,3 resulted in
precisely opposite holdings. The Sixth Circuit held that "Choose Life" was government
speech, and thus it did not violate the First Amendment that a "Choose Choice" or similar
pro-choice message was not approved as a specialty license plate.4 The Fourth Circuit, in
contrast, held that the speech was a mixture of government and private speech and that
the State had unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by not approving
a pro-choice specialty license plate.5
1 Henderson v. Stadler, 287 F.3d 374 (5 th Cir. 2002).
2 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4 th Cir. 2004).
3 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6 th Cir. 2006).
4 Id. at 375 ("In this case, Johanns requires the court to conclude that 'Choose Life' is Tennessee's message
5 Planned Parenthood, 361 F.3d at 799 ("In sum, South Carolina has engaged in viewpoint discrimination
by allowing only the Choose Life plate .... ."). The Second Circuit also addressed the issue, but in a
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None of the existing discussion, however, has examined an illuminating analogy
to a context in which the government administers a program allowing the speech of
outside groups on government-owned property: advertising. The analogy to advertising
helps to solve two problems. First, the comparison helps to demonstrate why the
"Choose Life" license plate should not be understood as government speech. Second, the
standard of forbidding arbitrary administration of advertising programs supplements the
doctrinal forum analysis that is otherwise an imperfect analytical tool in the case of
specialty license plates.
In Part I of this Article, I examine the factual circumstances of both cases and the
split circuit decisions themselves, specifically the crucial disagreement on whether
"Choose Life" constitutes government speech. In Part II, I briefly outline the First
Amendment doctrinal issues in play, the concepts of forum and government speech; and
explain why the existing forum analysis fails to usefully elucidate the question of
specialty license plates. In Part III, I develop the analogy between government-owned
advertising space and government-administered specialty license plates, then explain why
the analogy is more apt than the claim that "Choose Life" is government speech. In Part
IV, I apply the advertising decisions discussed in Part II to the question of "Choose Life"
specialty license plates. This new source of context will demonstrate that a state
legislature may not individually establish specialty license plates through statute.
Instead, the legislature may only choose acceptable subjects to appear on license plates,
and must leave individual applications under the care of a neutral administrator.
I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In both Tennessee and South Carolina, the state legislatures passed statutes
establishing general programs through which a group within certain categories-
generally charities, nonprofit groups, and college affinity organizations-may apply for
its own specialty plate. Both programs have relatively formulaic procedural requirements,
mandating discrete categories of allowable specialty license plates and the steps through
which a group may apply for a specialty plate. 6  Yet in both South Carolina and
Tennessee, the state legislatures passed specific statutes, separate from the general
program, authorizing the "Choose Life" license plates. 7  The statutes specific to the
"Choose Life" license plate thus exempt the sponsoring organizations and citizens
limited and non-precedential manner. The Children First Foundation applied for a "Choose Life" specialty
license plate in New York, but its application was denied, upon which point the foundation sued the New
York DMV and other state officials. Children First Found. v. Martinez, 2005 WL 600283 (N.D.N.Y.
2005). The Second Circuit heard an appeal only on to the district court's refusal to dismiss the suit based
on qualified immunity a refusal the Second Circuit affirmed but noted in passing that "custom license
plates involve, at minimum, some private speech. Therefore, it would not have been reasonable for
defendants to conclude [the government speech doctrine] permitted viewpoint discrimination in this case."
(citations omitted) Children First Found. v. Martinez, 169 Fed. Appx. 637, 639 (2nd Cir. 2006)
(unpublished).
6 In Tennessee, plates identifying both "cultural" and "collegiate" specialties are provided for by statute,
subject to 1,000 advance orders. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201 (2006). South Carolina allows nonprofit
organizations to apply by sending proof of nonprofit status, a marketing plan for the license plate, a
proposed design for the specialty plate including written authorization for any trademarked or copyrighted
symbols, and either 400 prepaid applications or a $4,000 deposit. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000 (2005).
7 S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-306 (2006).
interested in purchasing such plates from the procedural steps specified in the separate
statutes. The allowable message is also different: South Carolina's general specialty
license plate statute allows only "symbols" or "emblems" to appear on the license plates,
rather than a message of support. "Choose Human Rights," for example, would not
appear on a license plate for Amnesty International. Rather, for all organizations but the
pro-life cause, only logos, not messages, are allowed. Additionally, it is unclear in both
states whether a "Choose Choice" or comparable message would be approved for a
specialty license plate, as political advocacy organizations would not necessarily qualify
as a nonprofit organization in South Carolina, nor as a cultural or collegiate group in
Tennessee.8  The "Choose Life" statutes further reduce the requirements placed upon
individuals purchasing the specialty license plates-notably, in South Carolina a person
wishing to purchase a specialty license plate for a nonprofit group must be a "certified
member" of the nonprofit organization, while any person may purchase a "Choose Life"
plate. 9
A. Government Speech
The two circuit courts to address the issue of "Choose Life" license plates differed
on one key issue: whether the "Choose Life" message was government speech. In
Planned Parenthood v. Rose, the opinion of the Fourth Circuit noted that South
Carolina's "primary argument is that the license plate message, 'Choose Life,' is State
speech."' 1 South Carolina continued to advance this position in its unsuccessful petition
to the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, arguing that the "Choose Life"
message was "the most recent and apparently most visible expression in a long line of
statements asserting the state's clear and oft-repeated preference for childbirth over
abortion."" In ACLU v. Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the state's argument
that 'Choose Life' is Tennessee's public message, just as 'Live Free or Die'
communicated New Hampshire's individualist values and state pride."' 12  The state
persevered with that argument in its opposition to the ACLU's petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court, asserting that "the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that
a reasonable person knows that the medium for the message in this case, a 'government-
issued license plate,' is government-issued and 'a fortiori conveys a government
message."'13
8 Furthermore, First Amendment jurisprudence is clear that a group challenging a licensing scheme need
not apply and be denied such a license before challenging the scheme in court. See, e.g., Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) ("Litigants ... are permitted to challenge a [policy] not because their
own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the
policy's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression."); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965) ("In the area of freedom of
expression it is well established that one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates
overly broad licensing discretion to an administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be
proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he applied for a license.").
9 S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000(D) (2005).
10 Planned Parenthood, 361 F.3d at 794.
" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Rose v. Planned Parenthood of S.C., 543 U.S. 1119 (2004) (No. 04-
429), 2004 WL 2191193.
12 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6 th Cir. 2006).
13 State Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 9, ACLU v. Bredesen, 126 S.Ct. 2972
(2006) (No. 05-1389), 2006 WL 1557888.
The argument that the "Choose Life" message on the license plate is attributable
to the government takes two distinct forms, both of which understand the government's
administration of the specialty license plate program as government authorship and
creation of the speech. First, there is the argument that the message itself is expressing a
government position. The Sixth Circuit took Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association
to be controlling. 14 In that case, the Supreme Court held that it did not violate the First
Amendment rights of beef producers to use targeted assessments in part to fund a
governmentally-led marketing campaign promoting consumption of beef. The
organizations challenging the marketing campaign alleged that a nongovernmental
organization wrote the content of the marketing campaign, so it could not be considered
government speech. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that "[Lt]he
message of the promotional campaigns is effectively controlled by the Federal
Government itself." 15 The Sixth Circuit cited the case to find that
Tennessee set the overall message and the specific message when it
spelled out in the statute [authorizing the license plates] that these plates
would bear the words "Choose Life." . . . As in Johanns, here Tennessee
"sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every word
that is disseminated" on the "Choose Life" plate. It is Tennessee's own
16
message.
The second strand of the argument is that "Choose Life" is not simply a message
of the state government, but an implementation of a government program. This argument
relies upon Rust v. Sullivan, in which the Supreme Court upheld restrictions prohibiting
doctors working at clinics receiving funding from the government through Title X from
providing any information on abortion to their patients.17 The dissent from the Fourth
Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc contends that "[Lt]he 'Choose Life" statute is
analogous to the federal regulations at issue in Rust" because the license plate program
"earmarks revenues generated from sales of this specialty plate for a government grant
program established to fund crisis pregnancy services that specifically do not counsel
abortion."' 18 South Carolina continued to advance this argument in its brief to the
Supreme Court, stating that "the speech is uttered as part of a program to provide
additional funding to crisis pregnancy centers that do not 'provide, promote, or refer for
abortion."' 19 The Sixth Circuit focused on the control that Tennessee maintained by
specifying the "Choose Life" message, stating that Rust established that when "the
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message,
it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled
nor distorted.,
20
14 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
15 Id. at 560.16 ACLU of Tenn., 441 F.3d at 376.
17 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
18 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 373 F.3d 580, 587 (2004) (Shedd, J. dissenting).
19 Petition for Writ, supra note 11, at 21.
20 ACLU of Tenn., 441 F.3d at 378 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995)).
B. Forum
The circuits also split on the question of what type of forum the license plates, as
used in the specialty license plate programs, are. The Fourth Circuit found that South
Carolina "created a limited (license plate) forum for expression." 21 In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit found that the "view that volunteer dissemination of a government-crafted
message creates a 'forum' . .. would force the government to produce messages that fight
against its policies, or render unconstitutional a large swath of government actions that
nearly everyone would consider desirable and legitimate." 22 The Sixth Circuit therefore
attributed the "Choose Life" message entirely to the government, and held that no forum
had been created or existed.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
A. Forum
Under First Amendment doctrine, the threshold question to ask in a case of
alleged violation of free speech is in what type of forum the restriction takes place: a
traditional public forum, nonpublic forum, or designated public forum. A traditional
public forum is an area "which by long tradition or by government fiat [has] been
devoted to assembly and debate," such as public parks or streets.23 In a public forum, the
right to unrestricted speech is at its zenith: government may only constitutionally regulate
the time, place, and manner of speech so long as the regulation is content-neutral, is
narrowly tailored to further a significant state interest, and "ample alternative channels of
communication" are still available. 24 A designated public forum is government property
that the government has voluntarily made available as a place of open and free discussion
by the public, and is subject to the same limitations on government regulation of speech
as a traditional public forum.25 A nonpublic forum is government property which has not
been opened to public discourse, and restrictions of speech are constitutional as long as
the restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.26
It is clear that license plates are not a traditional public forum. Much of the extant
scholarship discussing the "Choose Life" license plates discusses the remaining
possibilities: whether license plates in states that have established a general procedure for
making specialty license plates have become a designated public forum or remain a
nonpublic forum.
27
A designated public forum is not a place in which the government has allowed
some speech. The Supreme Court has held that a designated public forum is not created
21 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4 th Cir. 2004).
22 ACLUof Tenn., 441 F.3d at 378-79.
23 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 45-46.
26 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992).
27 Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions
of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71 (2004); Jack Achiezer Guggenheim & Jed M.
Silversmith, Confederate License Plates at the Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates, Special
Registration Organization Plates, Bumper Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity, and the First Amendment, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 563 (2000); Jeremy T. Berry, Comment, Licensing a Choice: "Choose Life" Specialty
License Plates and their Constitutional Implications, 51 EMORY L.J. 1605, 1624-30 (2002).
by "permitting limited discourse," but only "by intentionally opening a nontraditional
public forum for public discourse. 28  In a later case, the Court further explained the
distinction as between opening a forum for "general access," when the forum is made
"generally available to a certain class of speakers," and "selective access," when "it does
no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers,
whose members must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission."' 29
In the case of the specialty license plate programs, it seems clear that the statutes
allowing certain types of groups or people, such as fans or alumni of a particular college,
indicate the existence of a nonpublic forum. 30 Some private speech is invited, as private
citizens may express their membership in certain groups or support of certain causes or
schools if they apply to do so. General access, however, is not permitted, as the statutes
authorizing the specialty license plate programs do not invite anyone to print any
message they would like on the license plates. Rather, the specific procedures and
requirements by which specialty plates are obtained fit neatly into the description of
reserving eligibility to a class of speakers who must individually then obtain permission.
It is crucial to the issue of "Choose Life" license plates that in no type of forum-
neither designated public forum nor nonpublic forum-may the government "suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 3' The
government, while it may limit access to a nonpublic forum, may not limit that access
through viewpoint discrimination. In this case, the government is not seeking to suppress
the pro-choice point of view outright, but by passing a separate statute privileging the
pro-life point of view, it is "accord[ing] preferential treatment to the expression of views
on one particular subject;" a form of viewpoint discrimination. 2  Because the
government is engaging in viewpoint discrimination, therefore, the question of forum is
moot: if there is any kind of forum, the States' actions are unconstitutional. The only
argument that can save the States is if they are able to claim that they, as South Carolina
or Tennessee, are speaking.
28 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
29 Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998).
30 A similar issue has arisen with regard to vanity license plates, or applications that allow any citizen to
request a certain combination of letters and numbers as the actual license plate itself, rather than a symbol
added to a blank portion of the plate, as here. A number of citizens who were denied their requested
license plate have sued on First Amendment grounds, with mixed results. For example, after a citizen
challenged the denied renewal of her license plate reading "ARYAN-I," the Eighth Circuit discussed
whether the license plate should be understood as a nonpublic or designated public forum and indicated
they were inclined towards designated public, before finding that the forum designation was irrelevant
because the statute prohibiting license plate numbers "contrary to public policy" left an unconstitutional
amount of discretion to the official enforcing the regulation. Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8 th
Cir. 2001) ("We express some initial skepticism about characterizing a license plate as a nonpublic forum,
because it occurs to us that a personalized plate is not so very different from a bumper sticker that expresses
a social or political message. The evident purpose of such a "forum," moreover, if it is one, is to give vent
to the personality, and to reveal the character or views, of the plate's holder.").
31 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
32 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
B. Government speech
1. Doctrine
The only context in which the government may explicitly privilege one viewpoint
or message over another is when the viewpoint is that of the government itself; when the
government itself is speaking. In that context, the government has no obligation to fund
or allow, if in a government-owned forum, the opposite point of view. The government
cannot force private citizens to carry the government's message against their will-a case
decided in the specific context of license plates 33 -but neither must the government
produce or fund speech in the same manner with an opposing message.
The governmental speech doctrine is, as the Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged, "relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise." 34 Commentators have
specifically noted that the concepts of designated and nonpublic forums and government
speech "are on a collision course." 35 The reason for the confusion is that, as Leslie
Gielow Jacobs points out, the government does not always "act[] separately and
distinctly." 36 Rather, the government often "interacts with private speakers" by giving
them "access to property, media access, financial assistance, or acknowledgement of their
assistance in a government program. . . . The dilemma for purposes of constitutional
analysis is that it becomes difficult to determine who's talking."
37
Because of the lack of doctrinal clarity, it is difficult to outline the field of
government speech in the abstract. Where clear tests have been established in other areas
of speech, such as inciting illegal conduct, an unambiguous framework of the government
speech doctrine has yet to clearly emerge from iterations of case-by-case analysis. For
the sake of organizational clarity, therefore, this Part will be ordered by the arguments as
made by South Carolina and Tennessee.
2. Arguments as Presented by Tennessee and South Carolina
Both South Carolina and Tennessee argue that the "Choose Life" message on
specialty license plates is in fact speech of the state itself, primarily using two Supreme
Court cases as precedent.
i. Johanns
As noted in Section I.A., supra, the Sixth Circuit's opinion held that Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Association determined the outcome of the case. 38 The Sixth Circuit
found that because Tennessee had final approval over the message on the "Choose Life"
license plate, it was the author of that message.
3Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
14 Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assoc., 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
" Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions
of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 73 (2004). Dolan's Article proposes creation of the
"special purpose forum.., where government has a subjective expressive purpose that includes particular
values and is carried out through selection of private speakers."
36 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 35, 37 (2002).
37 id.
38 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
The problem with the Sixth Circuit's use of Johanns, however, is that the issue in
Johanns was not simply whether the message supporting beef consumption was
government speech. In fact, the question of whether the message itself was government
speech was the weakest challenge, and not one that any of the Justices writing opinions
spent much time on. It was virtually accepted as a given that the message itself was
government speech: the two issues that caused controversy were whether the assessment
on the beef producers funding the advertisements was appropriate (a compelled speech
question), and whether it was fair for the government to not identify its message clearly
as sponsored by the government. For example, Justice Souter's dissent argued
In these cases, the requirement of effective public accountability means
the ranchers ought to prevail, it being clear that the Beef Act does not
establish an advertising scheme subject to effective democratic checks.
The reason for this is simple: the ads are not required to show any sign of
being speech by the Government, and experience under the Act
demonstrates how effectively the Government has masked its role in
producing the ads.
39
There was no question that Congress "directed the implementation of a
'coordinated program' of promotion" of beef consumption. 40 The questions, rather, were
of the subsidies and the fear of misattribution.
There is no question of subsidies or compelled speech in the case of "Choose
Life" specialty license plates, precisely because of the private involvement necessary for
the message to be carried. The problem of accountability is still an issue for the "Choose
Life" plates, as identified by both the courts41 and commentators. 42 But there are two
main differences between Johanns and the "Choose Life" license plates that make the use
of Johanns unhelpful.
First, the main question of the "Choose Life" license plates is not whether an
advertising campaign supervised and paid for by the government constitutes government
speech. There are a few similarities between the creation of "Choose Life" and "Beef.
It's What's for Dinner" as messages: in both cases, a private organization came up with
39 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 577 (Souter, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 561.
41 For example, the Fourth Circuit argued:
Of course, South Carolina could abolish the Choose Life license plate Act that results in
mixed speech and adopt "Choose Life" as its state motto. Then the State's identity as
speaker would be readily apparent, and the State would be accountable to the public for
its support of a particular position. Residents displeased with the State's position could
register their displeasure through the electoral process. However, precisely because this is
a case of mixed speech, and the identity of the speaker of the Choose Life message is
likely to be unclear to viewers of the license plate, govermnent accountability is
diminished. South Carolina has placed itself in a position to advocate for a political
position while disguising its advocacy as that of private vehicle owners.
Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4 th Cir. 2004).
42 Saumya Manohar, Look Who's Talking Now: "Choose Life" License Plates and Deceptive Government
Speech, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. (forthcoming 2007).
the actual slogan which was at some point approved by a government agent. 43 But in the
case of the beef campaign, there was no question that the government was funding the
message-through a tax on beef producers, but funding it nonetheless. There was no
involvement by private citizens paying their own money for the specific purpose of
carrying that message. The example of Johanns thus fails entirely to speak to the
question of the mixture of alleged government speech and private involvement and
speech that is the crux of the "Choose Life" cases. Johanns establishes only that a
message paid for and approved by the government is government speech-not that
messages paid for and sought out by private citizens are also government speech.
Second, Johanns fails to address the questions of forum that are at issue in the
context of "Choose Life" license plates. Accountability was so important in Johanns
precisely because the advertisements for beef did not appear in restricted forums: the
advertisements ran on television and in newspapers, where there was no allegation of the
government unfairly limiting discourse. The question in Johanns was whether the
government was trying to influence debate without being properly accountable through
the democratic process. The question in the "Choose Life" cases is whether the
government is trying to unfairly structure and restrict the entire debate because it controls
the forum. Precedent set in one, therefore, should not and does not apply in the other.
ii. Rust
Another case cited as relevant to the "Choose Life" specialty license plates was
Rust v. Sullivan.44 In Rust, the government action at issue was again related to funding.
Title X of the Public Health Service Act provided grants from the federal government to
groups providing family-planning counseling and assistance throughout the world. In
1988, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that it would not provide
any grant money to projects that involved counseling of abortion services. This included
referrals upon request: if a pregnant woman went to a clinic funded by Title X, said she
had already made her mind up to seek an abortion, and asked for a list of safe clinics or
doctors who provided abortions, if the clinic provided her with such a list it would lose its
Title X funding.45 Furthermore, any Title X activities had to be organized "physically
and financially" separated from any activities that did counsel abortion.46  Mere
separation of funds was not sufficient: a list of factors the Department would take into
account in deciding whether the Title X projects were sufficiently separate included
existence of separate personnel and physical separation of facilities. The new regulations
were challenged as viewpoint discrimination, as they prohibited any expression that
abortion was a legal, acceptable, or even possible option for women. The Supreme Court
held that this was not viewpoint discrimination:
4, It is an important distinction, however, that the beef campaign was created by a marketing company paid
by the government as part of an extant campaign, whereas "Choose Life" is a message created by a private
organization running campaigns in numerous states to put the private message on specialty license plates.
In the case of beef, the government approached a public relations company to come up with a slogan. In
the case of "Choose Life," an anti-abortion group approached the government.
44 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
45 Id. at 180 ("The Title X project is expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion
provider, even upon specific request.").
46 [d.
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund
a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.47
The Supreme Court thus accepted the government's argument that the Department
of Health and Human Services was not restricting the speech of doctors funded with Title
X money, but rather choosing to fund private speech that furthered the government's own
message and philosophy, that all pregnancies should be carried to term.
4 8
It is essentially this same argument that South Carolina and Tennessee made in
the context of "Choose Life" license plates: that the State was merely supporting the
message that all pregnancies should be carried to term rather than the diversity of other
possible views that might be expressed on a license plate. For example, after losing in
the Fourth Circuit, South Carolina continued to advance a Rust-based argument in its
brief to the Supreme Court, stating that "the speech is uttered as part of a program to
provide additional funding to crisis pregnancy centers that do not 'provide, promote, or
refer for abortion."' 49 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit extrapolated from Rust to find that the
fact that the license plate carriers were not paid as part of a program was irrelevant:
If in this case Tennessee drivers were paid by the government to display
"Choose Life" plates, the Act would unquestionably be constitutional....
The doctors in Rust disagreed with the government's anti-abortion policy.
But if they had been true believers in the policy and had volunteered to
work in the program free of charge, the speech restrictions in Rust would
still have expressed the government's anti-abortion viewpoint-and
therefore qualified for government speech treatment. . . . No
constitutionally significant distinction exists between volunteer
disseminators and paid disseminators.
50
The Rust argument thus claims that the "Choose Life" license plates are merely
one facet of a larger government program supporting carrying every pregnancy to term.
The greatest weakness, obviously, in this comparison is that neither Tennessee
nor South Carolina was funding an identifiable larger program such as Title X in Rust, so
47 1d. at 193.
48 See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001):
The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling
activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when
interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this
understanding. We have said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in
instances in which the government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust, in which
the government "used private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own
program. (citations omitted)
49 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Rose v. Planned Parenthood of S.C., 543 U.S. 1119 (2004) (No. 04-
429), 2004 WL 2191193.
50 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6th Cir. 2006).
the basic analogy cannot hold. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's argument that the
"Choose Life" purchasers are volunteer disseminators who should be treated the same as
paid disseminators is also inaccurate. As will be discussed in more detail below, the
private purchasers of "Choose Life" plates are not simply volunteering to carry a
message-they are paying the entire cost of the specialty plates. The fees that each
individual wishing to purchase a specialty license plate must pay compensate the state for
all additional costs of manufacture and handling, and even results in a considerable
surplus, which is generally donated both to anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers and, in
many cases, state funds. 51 It is simply untenable to argue that a private citizen
independently choosing and paying for the cost of carrying a message is not engaging in
private speech. Justice Martin of the Sixth Circuit expressed this understanding in his
dissent, asserting that
It proves too much to suggest, as the majority does, that any government
involvement in speech turns that speech into government speech immune
from First Amendment restrictions. Thus, Tennessee's license plate
program falls not within the broader holding of Rust, but within the
Court's caveat that the government, despite some involvement and despite
providing a subsidy of sorts (here, providing the license plates for the
messages), may not restrict speech in areas it has designed to facilitate
private speech.52
Furthermore, later explanations of Rust further underscore that the holding of Rust
is simply inapplicable to the "Choose Life" cases. In a later case, the Supreme Court
clarified Rust, stating that "Title X did not single out a particular idea for suppression
because it was dangerous or disfavored; rather, Congress prohibited Title X doctors from
counseling that was outside the scope of the project. ', 53 Framed in this manner, the
comparison to Rust is more clearly incorrect. It would be plainly impossible to assert that
the State could constitutionally prohibit a message that volunteers sought out as outside
the scope of a project in which the government paid no money and organized no carriers.
Such a "program" would be tantamount to saying that the government was free to
privilege the private speech with which it agreed-precisely the viewpoint discrimination
that the First Amendment is designed to prevent. The government may speak for itself-
but it may not privilege private speakers with whom it agrees. The specific funding
program set up in Rust is one way of determining where that line is drawn, and it is
because of the importance of having the distinction between government and private
speech that the Rust holding cannot be universalized into any message which the
government has not actually chosen to fund, but merely likes better than the opposing
viewpoint.
51 For example, a full fifty percent of the profits on "Choose Life" license plates in Tennessee go to
Tennessee, via the Tennessee Arts Commission and Tennessee Highway Fund. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-
215(a) (2006) (specifying the funding allocations). See also infra Section III.B.
52 ACLU of Tenn., 441 F.3d at 388 (Martin, J., dissenting).
53 Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 541 (2001).
3. Further Examples of Government Speech
There are a few other examples of cases in which a government speech argument
has proven successful that are useful to briefly outline.
i. Government Funding the Arts and Advocacy
One such decision is National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, in which a group
of artists challenged the basis upon which decisions about which artworks to subsidize
were made as discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.54 The reason for this allegation
was a statute passed by Congress specifying that decisions regarding which artworks to
subsidize should "tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." 55 The artists, who produced
controversial works that they acknowledged offended many people, asserted that the
statutory directive targeted their works because of the viewpoint or message that was
hostile or critical of American society: the law "rejects any artistic speech that either fails
to respect mainstream values or offends standards of decency." 56 The Supreme Court
held, however, that the purpose of the National Endowment's program was to "make
aesthetic judgments," thus the "inherently content-based 'excellence"' standard was "the
nature of arts funding. 57  Leslie Gielow Jacobs describes such a situation as a
"Government Quality Arbiter," in which the government is directed to fund expression
based on some judgment of aesthetic quality. 58 Given that there is no question of such
an artistic competition in the case of the "Choose Life" license plates, no precedent is
applicable. Similarly, Gielow Jacobs has also identified the "government as editor,"
when the government "compil[es] numerous private messages into a unique
presentation." 59 In this case as well, no "unique presentation" of compiled private
messages exists: each individual buying a license plate carries that license plate on their
own individual car. Gielow Jacobs also urges caution in the context of "government as
editor" cases, as such a circumstance can still constitute private speech "when the
circumstances of the particular presentation indicate that, rather than sending its own
message, the government editor is creating a private speech forum" 60
One key element of cases in which the government has unsuccessfully claimed
governmental speech is when the government seeks to manipulate an existing forum,
even when the government itself created that forum. For example, in Legal Services
Corporation v. Velazquez, Congress had established a program funding the Legal
Services Corporation providing legal assistance for persons unable to afford their own
attorney. The funding was contingent, however, on funds allocated through the Legal
Services Corporation not paying for lawsuits challenging welfare laws. 62 At first glance
this might seem akin to Rust-but the Court found that the restriction upon private speech
and forum was determinative. The LSC itself had begun under statute in 1974, and it was
5 Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
51 [d. at 576.
56 [d. at 580.
57 Id. at 585, 586.
58 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking?, supra note 36, at 52-54 (2002).
59 Id. at 50.
60 Id. at 52.
61 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001).
62 [d. at 536-37.
not until 1996 that the regulations restricting lawsuits challenging welfare laws
themselves were adopted.63 Furthermore, the Court addressed the greater involvement of
private speech directly, noting that "the salient point is that . . . the LSC program was
designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." 64 The
Court also identified the use of "the legal profession and the established Judiciary" as
indicating that the Government seeks to use an existing medium of expression and to
control it, in a class of cases, in ways which distort its usual functioning."
65
Just as in Legal Services Corporation, the States in the "Choose Life" cases seek
to use an existing medium. One can define the medium broadly, taking the forum to be
the car itself, in which there is no question that the medium exists for private expression.
But even license plates themselves are open to all sorts of other private expression, both
the other broad categories of specialty license plates approved and invited in both states,
and vanity plates, in which any citizen can request a particular license plate number to
spell out words or messages of his or her choosing. The government cannot take a
medium open to private expression-even one that it helped to create-and distort its
functioning by merely claiming some of the private speech being communicated in that
medium as its own.
ii. Other License Plate Cases
A brief mention of a few of the relevant previous cases regarding license plates is
also informative. There have been a number of cases in which persons denied a vanity
plate challenge the grounds upon which their request was denied. Although cases in
different jurisdictions have resulted in verdicts both striking down and affirming the
State's denial of individual vanity plates, for the most part restrictions on offensive,
objectionable, or obscene vanity license plates have been upheld, while restrictions based
upon narrower or content-specific grounds have been struck down. 66 For example, in
Pruitt v. Wilder, a Virginia District Court found that a policy prohibiting vanity license
plates with references to deities, challenged by a man seeking a plate reading
"GODZGUD," was unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.
67
The Fourth Circuit, notably, is one of the few courts in the country to have dealt
with a challenge to a specialty license plate scheme that did not involve "Choose Life"
license plates. In 2002, the court heard Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Commissioner of
the Virginia DMV,68 in which the Sons of Confederate Veterans challenged Virginia's
authorization of a specialty license plate for the SCV that specifically prohibited logos or
emblems on the license plate. Other organizations were allowed to place logos on
specialty license plates, and the restriction was widely understood to be because the SCV
logo included the Confederate flag, a symbol offensive to many Americans.
The Fourth Circuit created a four-part test to analyze whether specialty plates
were government or private speech, 69 which it later applied to the "Choose Life" license
plate scheme, finding in both cases that the specialty license plate programs had enough
63 Id. at 538.
64 [d. at 542.
651 d. at 542-43.
66 See Guggenheim & Silversmith, supra note 27, at 567-68.
67 Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Va. 1994).
68 288 F.3d 610 (4 th Cir. 2002).
69 [d. at 618.
an element of private speech that it could not be treated as government speech.
Furthermore, in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Luttig wrote
No one, upon careful consideration, would contend that, simply because
the government owns and controls the forum, all speech that takes place in
that forum is necessarily and exclusively government speech. Such would
mean that even speech by private individuals in traditional public forums
is government speech, which is obviously not the case.
70
Previous analyses of cases dealing with license plates, therefore, indicates a fairly
broad consensus that expression on license plates does not constitute government speech.
4. Additional Analysis of the License Plate Program Itself
As a conclusion, therefore, it is clear that specialty license plates cannot be
understood to be government speech. One easy way of assessing the claims to
government speech is a process of elimination: as the Fourth Circuit held, "[t]he medium
here - the specialty license plate scheme - is more like a limited forum for expression than
it is like a school, museum, or clinic," contrasting the specialty license plate programs to
the limited circumstances in which government speech has been upheld.71
Similarly, another easy line to draw is how money is spent in the specialty license
plate programs. In the examples of government speech upheld by the Supreme Court, the
government targeted money to specific programs and campaigns. In contrast, the
specialty license plates are entirely paid for by the individuals purchasing the plates. As
the Fourth Circuit noted in Sons of Confederate Veterans,
The supposed "honor" bestowed on a group for whom a special license
plate is authorized, in other words, is conditioned on the willingness of
350 private persons to pay extra to obtain the plate expressing the "honor."
If the General Assembly intends to speak, it is curious that it requires the
guaranteed collection of a designated amount of money from private
persons before its "speech" is triggered. It is not the case, in other words,
that the special plate program only incidentally produces revenue for the
Commonwealth. The very structure of the program ensures that only
special plate messages popular enough among private individuals to
produce a certain amount of revenue will be expressed.72
The only defense left is that the government wishes to select some of the private
speech taking place in a nonpublic forum that has been opened to broad categories of
persons as part of an unfunded, but tacitly supported, government program. In other
words, the dual statutes passed for specialty license plates-one for general applications,
70 Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm'r of the Va. DMV, 305 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
71 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir. 2004). The Court was referring to
Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); an Article cited earlier in the Opinion (R. Bezanson & W.
Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1422 (2001)); and Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
72 Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Commissioner of the Virginia DMV, 288 F.3d 610, 620 (2002).
one for license plates reading "Choose Life"-become evidence that the government has
claimed the "Choose Life" message as its own. As has been demonstrated above, such
selective claims to government speech are unconstitutional, but are in a slightly less
trenchant context as other allegations of viewpoint discrimination. The comparison to
advertising, as discussed in the next Part, is especially helpful in this context: the question
of "Choose Life" license plates does not arise in the same situation as Johanns, in which
the government wishes to interject its speech in an already public and free debate. The
license plates are a nonpublic forum, opened slightly by the government, in which the
government wishes to selectively claim some speech. In the next Part, I discuss the
comparison to advertising and why it is illuminating in this case.
III. THE ANALOGY TO ADVERTISING
A. Government Owned and Operated Advertising Space
There are a number of appellate cases in which a potential advertiser's chosen
message was denied access to a given advertising venue owned by the government.
These cases, one of which is from the very Sixth Circuit that upheld the selective
provision of "Choose Life" license plates, demonstrate that in situations in which the
government allows private citizens to pay for use of governmental resources to publicize
their message, viewpoint discriminations are unacceptable.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the Supreme Court upheld the city's
restriction prohibiting a political candidate from running campaign advertisements on
public transportation. 73 Just as opponents to the "Choose Life" plates claim today, the
candidate argued that the advertising space was a public forum, and thus refusing any
person willing to pay the required fee for the space violated the First Amendment. The
Court rejected this argument, focusing on the alternative purposes of the city transit
system. Because the City was "engaged in commerce," and "must provide ... service to
the commuters of Shaker Heights," the transit cars could not be a purely public forum.
Instead, the city government acted as administrator and was merely promulgating
regulations that were "reasonable legislative objectives advanced by the city in a
proprietary capacity." 74 Because the proprietor was the government, however, the Court
noted that "the policies and practices governing access to the transit system's advertising
space must not be arbitrary, capricious, or invidious."
75
Clarification of what practices are "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious" is found in
the lower appellate decisions. The cases establish the right of a governmental agent to
restrict the content of advertising by viewpoint-neutral categories, but not to discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint or ideology once a milieu was opened to a particular topic. For
example, in Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada v. Clark County School District,
the Ninth Circuit held that "controlling the content of school-sponsored publications so as
to maintain the appearance of neutrality on a controversial issue" was an appropriate
restriction, as the school district's decision not to publish advertisements for Planned
73 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
74 Id. at 304. The Court also held that "[n]o First Amendment forum is here to be found," but the decision
predates most of the Supreme Court decisions laying out the current understanding of public versus
nonpublic forums, so that portion of the opinion is no longer necessarily determinative today given the
developed jurisprudence.751 d. at 303.
Parenthood in school publications was "viewpoint neutral. 7 6 The court further noted
that the school district wished to "maintain a position of neutrality on the sensitive and
controversial issue of family planning" and did not want publications such as high school
yearbooks to be "forced to open up their publications for advertisements on both sides of
the 'pro-life' -'pro-choice' debate. 77
The Second Circuit similarly argued, in more direct form, that an advertising
space may only be restricted on the grounds of content rather than viewpoint in New York
Magazine v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority.78 In an opinion holding that the
advertising standards being applied had no restriction on the basis of political speech and
thus an advertisement criticizing the Mayor of New York could not be barred from New
York buses, the Second Circuit held that "[d]isallowing political speech, and allowing
commercial speech only, indicates that making money is the main goal. Allowing
political speech, conversely, evidences a general intent to open a space for discourse, and
a deliberate acceptance of the possibility of clashes of opinion and controversy. "
79
Most importantly, the Sixth Circuit itself has held that arbitrary restrictions on the
specific messages allowed in a given space are unconstitutional. In United Food &
Commer. Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority, the
Sixth Circuit upheld an injunction requiring the Ohio Transit Authority to accept an
advertisement for the union to appear on buses. 80 In its opinion, the court held that "in
accepting a wide array of political and public-issue speech," the transit authority
"demonstrated its intent to designate its advertising space a public forum. Acceptance of
a wide array of advertisements, including political and public-issue advertisements, is
indicative of the government's intent to create an open forum." 81 This was held "even
when speakers must obtain permission to use the forum."
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The very precedent of the Sixth Circuit, among others, thus demonstrates an
important point in the designation of forums owned by the government. Even if the
government owns a given resource, if it is opened up to speech by outside organizations
which pay for the access to the resource, that "pay-to-display" speech may not be
selected on the basis of viewpoint or ideology.
B. Specialty License Plates as Advertising Rather than Government Speech
The threshold question in the context of "Choose Life" license plates thus
becomes whether a license plate may be understood as akin to government advertising
space rather than government speech. There are important differences between an
explicit advertising space owned by the government, such as advertising cards on city
transit (common in cities across America) and license plates. But careful examination of
the circumstances demonstrates that the analogy holds.
One foundational distinction between advertising and government speech is
essentially where the money goes. In explicit advertising space, it is clear that it is a
76 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1999).
77 Id.
78 136 F.3d 123 (2
n
ld Cir. 1998).
79 Id. at 130. The Second Circuit further held that allowing political advertising meant that "the advertising
space on the outside of MTA buses is a designated forum." Id.
80 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998).
81 Id. at 355.
82 [d. at 352.
commercial venture dedicated to generating revenue for the government. In contrast, the
argument that specialty license plates are, like in Rust v. Sullivan, implementing a
government program implies that, as in Rust, the government is choosing to allocate its
own money to further a program it supports.
The specialty license plate programs do not easily fit into either of those
categories. The specialty license plate schemes are not explicitly commercial enterprises,
in the sense that they are not devoted wholly to raising revenue for the government. But
neither does the government pay for any aspect of the specialty license plate production.
Examining the funding of the license plates more closely, it becomes clear at least that
the programs, while not entirely devoted to generating revenue, do raise money for the
government, and are thus a closer analog to advertising than to a government-funded
program. For example, the Sixth Circuit noted that Tennessee actually profits from the
license plates-half of the profits from the sales are donated to New Life Resources, an
anti-abortion nonprofit organization, forty percent is donated to the Tennessee arts
commission, and ten percent to the Tennessee highway fund. 83 South Carolina's statute
similarly specifies that fees paid for the license plates are deposited into a fund
administered by the Department of Social Services and distributed to local crisis
pregnancy centers only "after the costs to produce and administer the distribution" of the
license plates are paid from the proceeds. 84 In both cases at hand, the government raises
revenue then, via statute, makes a judgment on how that money is allocated. In both
examples at issue, the government decided to share the revenues produced with groups
linked to the message displayed. But in neither case does the government simply donate
space to outside groups-the government remains the administrator of the programs, and
in both South Carolina and Tennessee first pays all costs associated with the program
from the revenue generated. It is true that a substantial portion of the profits generated
finds its way to private organizations-but only after the government receives the money,
takes parts of it, and chooses to distribute the money.85
Second, advertising on government property is characterized by a physical object
upon which messages are displayed in exchange for money paid to the government,
generally through a third administering party. 86 Another distinction between a
straightforward advertising space and a license plate, therefore, is that license plates are
not objects whose sole purpose is for displaying advertisements. A closer definition of
the license plate within the analogy, however, eliminates this difference. In the example
of Lehman, the space under issue was not specifically the advertising cards alone-it was
the city transit vehicles which carried advertising cards. License plates, therefore, should
83 TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-306(c) (2006) ("The funds produced from the sale of Choose Life new
specialty earmarked license plates shall be allocated to New Life Resources ... ."); TENN. CODE ANN. §
55-4-215(a) (2006) (specifying the funding allocations); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 371
(6th Cir. 2006)..
84 S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8910(c) (2005).
85 It seems clear that had the City of Shaker Heights decided to donate the profits from advertising space on
its transit vehicles to charity, it would make the scheme itself no less an advertising venture. Even if the
City had chosen to donate profits from the advertisements back to the very industries or groups which had
purchased the space, that donation would not have made the entire scheme a charity donation rather than an
(irrationally-run) advertising program.
86 For example, in Lehman, the advertising space was actually sold by Metromedia, Inc., which held a
contract with the city specifying regulations such as that prohibiting political advertising. Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 299-300 (1974).
be understood as a government object which is now open to displaying advertising on a
portion of the plate. The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged the expression
that can take place on a license plate, noting in Wooley v. Maynard that requiring New
Hampshire residents to display the motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates
"require[d]" them to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's
ideological message."
' 87
The next challenge to the advertising analogy, then, is why citizens should not be
allowed to freely choose to use their private property as a mobile billboard. After all,
citizens can freely adorn their vehicles with bumper stickers espousing whatever views
they wish-no citizens are here compelled to display the "Choose Life" message on their
license plate, so why shouldn't they be allowed to display the message?
It is in answering this question that the analogy to government-owned advertising
space is most illuminating. A car itself is not subject to First Amendment forum analysis,
as it is private, rather than government-owned, property. There is no question, therefore,
that a car owner can express nearly anything he or she likes on the car itself. The license
plate, however, is a controlled message which the government requires each car to carry
in an unobscured, easily visible manner.as
It would seem at first glance, then, that because the government mandates the
structure of the license plate itself, that the government also controls all messages on the
license plate and may fairly claim them as its own speech. The "Choose Life" message,
however, was not a message crafted by the government. In contrast, the "Choose Life"
license plates were created on the impetus of private citizens. The idea of the program
was first generated by Marion County Commissioner Randy Harris in 1996,89 and
Harris's nonprofit organization "Choose Life, Inc." reports "'communicating with groups
and individuals in over 46 states" in order to "[h]elp[] them with their Choose Life
license plate process."
' 90
In each state, furthermore, "Choose Life" license plates are displayed only when
private citizens choose to pay extra for the specialty plates. As Judge Martin noted in his
dissent from ACLU v. Bredesen, "[i]t is also curious that the government, if it wished to
speak and promote a message, would first require at least 1,000 individuals to pay the
government before it agreed to disseminate the message.
91
The message on the license plate, then, is a message crafted by an outside group,
paid for by individual citizens. While an individual walking down the street may not
think of himself as a walking billboard, if he has chosen to buy a sweatshirt that says
87 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
88 See, e.g., id. at 707.
89 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example of Specialty
License Plates, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 419, 427 (2001).
90 Other States Adopting the Choose Life Tag, http://www.choose-life.org/states.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2006).
9' ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 384 (6th Cir. 2006). The same point was raised in Sons of
Confederate Veterans v. Comm 'r of the Va. DMV, 288 F.3d 610 (2002), in which the Fourth Circuit held
that refusing to print the symbol of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, which included the Confederate flag,
on the organization's specialty license plates was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The court
noted, in response to a similar contention by Virginia that such specialty plates constituted government
speech that "[i]f the General Assembly intends to speak, it is curious that it requires the guaranteed
collection of a designated amount of money from private persons before its 'speech' is triggered." Id. at
620.
"Nike" he has (perhaps perversely) chosen to pay for the privilege of advertising the Nike
brand. If an individual car owner buys a sticker that says "Choose Life" and affixes it to
their bumper, it is her own independent personal expression. But when she has to submit
an application and fee for a specialty license plate manufactured by the government, the
government has become the administrator of what is essentially an advertising campaign
for the "Choose Life" foundation. In Lehman, a campaign wished to pay for its own
advertising to be carried on a bus. The campaign's funding was presumably aggregated
from the donations of individual supporters of Mr. Lehman's candidacy-but even if a
group of Lehman's supporters had bypassed the campaign and tried to purchase a
campaign advertisement themselves as an independent expenditure, the city still would
have declined the advertisement as a political message. In the case of "Choose Life"
license plates, the individual supporters of the "Choose Life" message have aggregated
themselves only to the extent that they meet the requirement of preorders for the specialty
plates. Despite their not forming one unitary order for 1,000 license plates placed by the
Choose Life Foundation itself, they still create the same type of program under which the
government sells space on its property to private groups. And as Lehman illustrates,
when the government administers such a program, there are requirements of fairness and
neutrality that bind how the program may be run-requirements that the "Choose Life"
schemes violate. In the next Part, I explain how the "Choose Life" programs violate the
requirements of Lehman.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF ADVERTISING PRECEDENTS
The application of the Supreme Court's mandate that advertising programs not be
administered in an "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious" manner is not as simple a process
as it might appear. The most arbitrary, capricious or invidious administration would
obviously be one in which a pro-choice organization made an application for a specialty
license plate under a general program and the application was denied, while a pro-life
license plate's application was approved. That is not what has happened in Tennessee
and South Carolina. Rather, in each state there is a dual-track system for license plate
approval.
It is the separate individual statutes authorizing "Choose Life" license plates
specifically that make the two-track system arbitrary, capricious, and invidious. Had
specialty license plates been limited to nonprofit organizations, sports teams, and the
other groups specified in the general statutes, the states would have "indicate[d] that
making money is the main goal," and thus not created a designated public forum for
political discourse. 92 Having allowed political messages in, however, Tennessee and
South Carolina "demonstrated [their] intent to designate its advertising space a public
forum."
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Having opened license plates to political discourse, having statutes privileging
one message over all others is an arbitrary and capricious distinction. In Lehman, the
Supreme Court specifically stated that one justification for that the "policies and practices
governing access" to the advertising space at issue was "in order to minimize . . . the
92 New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2 nd Cir. 1998).
93 United Food & Commer. Workers Union, v. S.W. Ohio Reg. Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 355 ( 6
th Cir.
1998).
appearance of favoritism." 94 It is hard to imagine a clearer demonstration of favoritism
on the part of the state legislature than privileging the pro-life point of view by passing a
separate statute allowing persons wishing to purchase a "Choose Life" license plate to
bypass the procedures every other organization must go through in order to receive
specialty license plates.
In addition, this analysis of favoritism helps to demonstrate why the standing
analysis applied by the Fifth Circuit dismissing a challenge to a similar program in
Louisiana is flawed. 95 The Fifth Circuit noted that none of the plaintiffs had applied for a
"Choose Choice" or similar license plate and been rejected, and thus concluded that none
of the plaintiffs had alleged an injury in fact.96 In South Carolina and Tennessee, no
plaintiffs alleged their applications under the general statute for a "Choose Choice"
license plate had been arbitrarily denied. 97 Yet understanding favoritism as arbitrary
administration of an advertising venue changes the question of injury. The injury is not,
as the Fifth Circuit found, a total inability to even apply for a pro-choice specialty license
plate. Rather it is a lack of a "level playing field." 98
In order to craft a neutral administration scheme for specialty license plates, the
individual statutes providing for "Choose Life" license plates must be struck down. If the
state legislatures wish to allow "Choose Life" license plates, the statutes providing for the
general administration of specialty plates must be amended to provide for political
messages in addition to charity organizations, colleges, and other groups currently
allowed to apply for specialty license plates. Finally, the statute must make clear that the
regulations are neutral and purely administrative in nature-no judgment other than
whether a group meets the requirements of the statute is allowable. The statute may
restrict messages in subject matter, but not in viewpoint. Any further criteria, such as a
specific allowance for a pro-life but not pro-choice message, is arbitrary and capricious.
CONCLUSION
Application of the freedom of speech principles derived from the advertising
cases reveals that a dual-track method by which a specialty license plate may be created
is unconstitutional. If a space is opened up to advertising of a certain subject, the
application process for advertising space must be neutral and should not be administered
by the legislature via special statutes granting access to favored groups. The proper
manner by which the state legislature may approve or deny use of government-controlled
advertising space is by determining which general subjects may appear on specialty
license plates-for example, a choice of whether or not to include political or campaign
messages on plates. Once that determination has been made, the specific control over
applications to print license plates with "Vote Democrat" or "Vote Republican" must be
applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner by an independent administrator rather than the
political vote of the legislature.
94 Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,303-04 (1974).
95 Henderson v. Stadler, 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002).
9 6 
[d. at 379.
97 Although importantly, the general statutes in both states only allowed nonprofit organizations or cultural
and collegiate groups to apply for license plates, indicating that an application for a "Choose Choice" or
other general political message license plate would have been denied as ineligible under the statute.
98 Planned Parenthood v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 790 (4th Cir. 2004).
